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Behavioural economics and the risks of tax 
administration 
 
 
Simon James* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Tax Administration is a risky business. When taxes are not well administered, tax morale may be undermined and 
unnecessary administrative and compliance costs incurred. Mainstream economics and the self-interested rational choice 
model provide a powerful contribution to understanding the effects of taxation but that analysis has not always been enough 
to avoid serious and expensive difficulties. Behavioural economics has been making an increasing contribution to 
understanding how tax administration may be improved. Some of the assumptions of mainstream economics have been 
subject to close scrutiny and DellaVigna (2009) summarized deviations from the standard model as non-standard preferences, 
non-standard beliefs and non-standard decision-making. In recent years considerable analysis and evidence have been 
presented on the importance of aspects such as fairness in taxation, the endowment effect, framing of decisions, limited 
attention, loss aversion and mental accounting and their impact on the operation of a tax system.  A risk management 
approach to tax administration has been developed by the European Commission, the OECD and others. One area that has 
received less attention than may be appropriate is the performance of tax agencies themselves. This paper therefore outlines 
the contribution behavioural economics can make to existing approaches in reducing the risks of tax administration and 
extends it to the performance of tax authorities themselves. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Challenges in dealing with taxpayer behaviour and the risks of tax administration are 
as old as taxation itself. A remarkable example is that, when income tax was first 
introduced in the UK in 1799, it was thought unacceptable that taxpayers should be 
required to disclose the precise level of their incomes. To deal with the obvious risks 
involved, the response was to require that taxpayers should declare that the tax paid 
was not less than the required 10 per cent of their income. As Pitt explained in 
introducing the income tax: 
The statement of income is to proceed from the party himself. In doing this it is not 
proposed that income shall be distinctly laid open, but it shall be declared only that the 
assessment is beyond the proportion of a tenth of the income of the person on whom it 
is imposed. In this way, the disclosure at which many may revolt may be avoided (Pitt, 
1798). 
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This led to a form of declaration given in an Act (39 Geo 3, c. 22) passed three months 
after the original Act, and shown in Figure 1 – and one of the simplest tax returns 
ever. 
 
Figure 1    The Original UK Income Tax Return. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I  do declare that I am willing to pay the sum of          for my contribution for one year, 
from the fifth day of April           until the fifth day of April        in pursuance of an Act passed 
in the thirty-ninth year of the reign of His present Majesty intituled…[the full name of the Act 
was entered here] and of another Act for amending the said Act: and I do declare that the said 
sum of        is not less than one tenth part of my income, estimated according to the directions 
and rules prescribed by the said Acts, to the best of my knowledge and belief. Dated this day 
of   
       Signed 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
To deal with the risk the Commissioners could demand further information and a 
hearing. Nevertheless, after the taxpayer had stated his case at the hearing and made 
an oath as to the truth of his return, he: 
shall not be compelled to answer; his books shall not be called for, not his 
confidential clerks or agents examined. If, however he declines to submit to 
the investigation of his books, and the examination of his clerks, and other 
means of ascertaining the truth, it shall be competent for the Commissioners 
to fix the assessment, and their decision shall be final, unless he appeals to 
the higher Commissioners. No disclosure is necessary, but if the party is 
unwilling to disclose, he must acquiesce in the decision of the 
Commissioners, who shall not be authorised to relieve without a full 
disclosure (Pitt, 1798). 
Since that time, the level and complexity of taxation have risen enormously and so has 
the pressure to deal with non-compliance. Behavioural economics has also been 
developing rapidly and adds to the contribution of more traditional analysis of 
economic behaviour. Mainstream economics has made a considerable contribution to 
understanding taxation but its basic assumption of self-interested rational behaviour 
narrowly defined does not give a good explanation of tax compliance. The penalty for 
ordinary tax convictions is usually modest, the chance of detection often trivial and yet 
most individuals pay their taxes. Hence some further explanation is required (Posner, 
2000, p. 1782). 
Sometimes the limitations of the mainstream approach are dramatically exposed. At a 
briefing by economists on the credit crunch at the London School of Economics on 5 
November 2008, the Queen was reported as asking why no one saw the credit crunch 
coming. Her Majesty’s question was debated by economists and others at a forum at 
the British Academy and their response indicated the importance of factors not 
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normally included mainstream economic analysis – such as ‘wishful thinking’, ‘a 
psychology of denial’, and ‘the psychology of herding’ (Besley and Hennessy, 2009, 
pp. 2-3). Furthermore, the Queen was advised that ‘Everyone seemed to be doing their 
own job properly on its own merit. And according to standard measures of success, 
they were often doing it well’ (ibid., p. 3). 
Behavioural factors can improve understanding of such events including tax 
compliance and non-compliance. As described further below, the behavioural 
approach draws on a wider range of assumptions than purely ‘rational’ ones in 
understanding individuals’ actions. One particular example is that it is conceptually 
better placed than the ‘rational’ approach to give issues of fairness and ‘tax morale’ 
the importance they deserve. 
Tax systems have, of course, taken account of phenomena described by behavioral 
economists, even if they were not explicitly recognized as such. For example, 
withholding at source, which can be traced back to the sixteenth century in England 
(Soos, 1995), deals with phenomena now described as the endowment effect, loss 
aversion and status quo bias. Nevertheless, taking account of such factors more 
explicitly may improve compliance more generally and systematically. This is 
particularly true because measures to improve compliance have often taken the form 
of mechanistic and relatively simplistic arrangements regarding auditing and penalties 
on the assumption, implicitly or explicitly, that taxpayers are motivated to comply 
with the tax system only on the balance of the associated financial gains and losses. 
They may also, of course, be motivated by other factors. Furthermore, it has always 
been clear that some areas of taxation are more likely than others to have a higher risk 
of uncollected taxation and consequently have been subjected to a greater level of 
enforcement activity. In recent times more systematic approaches have sometimes 
taken the form of developing risk management procedures. The paper therefore begins 
with a discussion of risk management in the present context in Section 2 followed by 
the contribution behavioural economics adds to more ‘rational’ approaches in Section 
3. Section 4 turns to the related area of responsive regulation in taxation. 
A relatively under explored application of the behavioural approach is the contribution 
it may make with regards to the performance of tax agencies. External change and 
management fashion (see Abrahamson, 1966) can pose serious risks to the functioning 
of organisations including tax authorities. In Section 5, this paper therefore turns to the 
management of tax agencies.  It examines some of the risks of a ‘rational’ approach to 
management reform and the importance of a behavioural perspective. Some of issues 
are illustrated by drawing on radical changes to UK tax administration. Finally, 
Section 6 draws some conclusions.  
2. RISK MANAGEMENT AND TAX ADMINISTRATION 
Within the study of management, ‘risk management’ has expanded dramatically in the 
last twenty years, developing from an element of management control to an aspect of 
good governance for many organisations. Despite this huge growth and the impressive 
development of concepts and techniques (see for example, McNeil, et al. 2005) it can 
still be argued that risk management ‘is first and foremost about sound general 
management’ (Culp, 2001, p. ix) and that perhaps it is not all about real hazards and 
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opportunities but quite a lot about organisational accountability and legitimacy 
(Power, 2007). It is therefore relevant to examine not only risk management with 
respect to taxpayers, of which there is an existing literature, but also risk management 
with respect to the conduct of tax administrators more generally, about which less has 
been said in this respect.  
The European Commission’s Risk Management Guide for Tax Administrations (2006, 
p. 13) described risk management as ‘taking deliberate action to improve the odds’ of 
good outcomes and reducing the odds of bad outcomes. It is not a magic formula that 
will always give the right answers but it is ‘a way of working and thinking that will 
give better answers to better questions’. Interestingly, the EC guide goes on to suggest 
that the concept of risk has its roots in the ancient Italian maritime trade – from the 
concept of uncertainty and possibility of loss. Risks consist of the characteristics of 
‘vulnerability, severity or significance and relative occurrence or frequency’. The 
European Commission’s Guide also states that ‘Risk analysis also involves the why 
question: why is the taxpayer behaving in a particular fashion. This is important 
because it contributes to the assessment and the choice of the most efficient and 
effective form of treatment’ (p. 6). 
The OECD’s (2004, p. 37) Compliance Risk Management cites the analysis of James 
et al., (2001) in identifying two main approaches to examining compliance. The first 
of these is based on economic assumptions of rationality of the sort mentioned above 
with a reliance on penalties. However, there has been an increasing awareness that 
understanding the factors influencing taxpayers’ behaviour may also have an 
important role to play and this is examined further in the following section. The 
OECD (2004, p. 8) formally describes compliance risk management as a ‘structured 
process for the systematic identification, assessment, ranking and treatment of tax 
compliance risks’ such as the failure to register or the failure to report tax liabilities 
properly. The OECD outlines the way a compliance risk management process may be 
applied by a revenue authority in the following stages: 
Identify risks 
Assess and prioritise risks 
Analyse compliance behaviour (causes, options for treatment) 
Determine treatment strategies 
Plan and implement stages. 
The two stages that may benefit most from a behavioural approach are the analysis of 
compliance behaviour and determining ‘treatment strategies’. The process would 
continue with the compliance outcomes regarding registration, filing, reporting and 
payment being evaluated and performance measured against plan. As the OECD 
(2004, p. 8) points out this is consistent with the existing management literature which 
has also been applied more generally, for example by James and Edwards (2007) to 
income tax.  
The International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2012) provides an online 
collection of tax compliance arrangements in different countries including a guide to 
tax risk management for designing an internal structure and strategy for minimising 
the unintended risks of non-compliance. A further contribution by Thompson (2008) 
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on behalf of the Caribbean Organization of Tax Administration illustrated the 
principles and application of risk management and how tax authorities may use them 
to improve voluntary compliance. 
An additional point has been made by the OECD (2009): that large businesses are 
increasingly considering tax risk management as a specific element of corporate 
governance. In examining the experience of three countries – Australia, Canada and 
Chile - the OECD found that ‘large businesses that have good corporate governance 
and more transparent relationships with tax administrations can expect fewer audit 
interventions and greater certainty’. 
3. THE CONTRIBUTION OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS 
The academic literature relating to behavioural economics is now very substantial. 
Schwartz (2008) and Wilkinson (2008) have both provided introductions and 
collections of papers on behavioural economics have been edited by Altman (2006), 
Loewenstein, (2007), and Maital (2007). There is also a collection of readings 
specifically on behavioural public finance edited by McCaffery and Slemrod (2006). 
There have been specific applications to taxation – for example, Congdon et al. (2009) 
related behavioural economics and tax policy and Reeson and Dunstall (2009) 
examined the implications of behavioural economics and complex decision-making 
for the Australian tax and transfer system. 
Behavioural economics has been described as increasing the explanatory power of 
economics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations’ Camerer and 
Loewenstein (2004, p. 3) though it also draws on other disciplines. Its approach 
involves modifying ‘the standard economic model to account for psychophysical 
properties of preference and judgement, which create limits on rational calculation, 
willpower and greed’ (Camerer and Malmendier, 2007, p. 235) and further analysis is 
presented by Tomer (2007).  
A particular theme arising from this approach is the importance of fairness both in 
economic behaviour in general (see for example Kahneman et al., 1986a and 1986b) 
and behaviour with respect to tax compliance in particular (for instance Bordignon 
1993 and Cowell, 1992).  
Such an approach is consistent with the contribution of the classical economists. For 
example Adam Smith has been described as a behavioural economist and his ‘world is 
not inhabited by dispassionate rational purely self-interested agents, but rather by 
multidimensional and realistic human beings’ (Ashraf et al. p. 142). However, the 
main thrust of the analysis in mainstream economics and, indeed, parts of some other 
disciplines such as management, has developed on the basis of that part of Adam 
Smith’s (1776) contribution that economic behaviour was motivated by self-interest. 
Economics therefore became the mechanics of utility and self-interest and simply a 
‘calculus of pleasure and pain’ (Jevons, 1888). Such an approach has led to many 
important insights and understanding of economic behaviour but the central 
assumption that human beings are largely motivated by immediate self-interest and 
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rationality, narrowly defined, has its limitations. This approach has been vividly 
described by Veblen as follows: 
The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of 
pleasures and pains who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of 
happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but 
leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated 
definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of the 
impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another. Self-imposed 
in elemental space, he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual axis until 
the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, whereupon he follows the 
line of the resultant. When the force of the impact is spent, he comes to rest, 
a self-contained globule of desire as before (Veblen, 1898, pp. 389-90). 
However, such an approach does not explain much observed behaviour such as the 
willingness of citizens to act in the public interest, even when it may not appear to be 
in their own immediate self-interest. As already mentioned above, this happens when 
taxpayers meet their liabilities to a large extent without the need for an unduly 
coercive tax regime. Another example is the well-known tendency of some US 
taxpayers to make interest-free loans to government by having more income tax than 
necessary withheld from their salaries followed by a refund after the end of the tax 
year (Fennell, 2006). 
Furthermore it taxpayers may not react well to an onerous regime, however much it 
may look to be effective. For instance both Schmölders (1970) and Strümpel (1969) 
reported that the German system was very rigid in its assessment procedures which led 
to an ‘effective’ but expensive and confrontational system. A notable outcome ‘of the 
relatively coercive tax-enforcement techniques is the high degree of alienation from 
the state…[which] negatively influences the willingness to cooperate’ (Strümpel, 
1969, p. 29).  
In contrast to the approach based heavily on self-interest, behavioural economics has 
involved subjecting the assumptions of mainstream economics to close scrutiny. 
DellaVigna (2009) summarized deviations from the standard model as non-standard 
preferences, non-standard beliefs and non-standard decision-making. In recent years 
considerable analysis and evidence have been presented on the importance of aspects 
such as fairness in taxation, the endowment effect, framing of decisions, limited 
attention, loss aversion and mental accounting that may impact on the administration 
of a tax system.  Congdon et al. (2009: 375) stated: the implications of behavioural 
economics’ for public policy, including tax policy, have yet to be systematically 
explored, and …this oversight leads to both mistaken policy and missed opportunity’. 
Behavioural economics has also reached a wider audience. For example, the book 
Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) became ‘required reading’ on a 2008 summer 
reading list for Conservative MPs in the UK. This was because authors’ argue that 
sometimes voters need a gentle push to do the right thing, a view seemingly consistent 
with the Conservative Party’s tax and welfare policies. From that approach came the 
Behavioural Insight Team or ‘nudge unit’ which was set up 2010 in the UK Cabinet 
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Office. Its role is to develop ways of helping people make better choices rather than 
trying to force them to do so. One early initiative in taxation improved some 
taxpayers’ responses by changing letters from the tax office to explain that most 
people in their area had already paid their taxes. 
For the present purpose, the behavioural economics approach examines a range of 
factors which may influence taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. Some of the work also 
draws on other academic disciplines such as sociology in considering variables such as 
social support, social influence and certain background factors such as age, gender, 
race and culture. Psychology reinforces this approach and has even created its own 
branch of ‘fiscal psychology’ pioneered by Schmölders (1959) and reinforced by 
others such as Lewis (1982). A specific example of a relevant factor is referred to as 
‘framing’ where it has been observed that the way an issue is framed can be an 
important influence on individuals’ responses (Tversky and Kahneman (1981). This 
seems to be true in general and with respect to tax compliance in particular (see, for 
example, Holler, et al., 2008). Other important aspects include fairness in taxation, the 
endowment effect, limited attention, loss aversion and mental accounting. 
There are many detailed contributions to the behavioural approach. Reflecting widely 
held views, Braithwaite et al. (2003) examined such factors as the perception of justice 
and Feld and Frey (2007) suggested that taxpayers are prepared to comply with the tax 
system if they perceive the political process is fair and legitimate. The roles of 
individuals in society and accepted norms of behaviour have also been shown to have 
a strong influence (Wenzel 2004 and 2005). This all has links with the rapidly 
expanding literature on tax morale which might be defined as ‘an individual’s intrinsic 
willingness to pay taxes’ (Alm and Torgler, 2006, p. 224) and which is examined 
further in Torgler (2007). Background factors such as cultural influence have been 
examined by Coleman and Freeman (1997) and Cummings et al. (2004), and so have 
the implications of different political systems (Pommerehne et al., 1994). More direct 
contributions to policy in this area have come from a number of authors. For example, 
one is an appeal to taxpayers’ conscience (Hasseldine and Kaplan, 1992) and also to 
feelings of guilt and shame (Erard and Feinstein, 1994). Others have suggested more 
positive help for taxpayers (Hite, 1989) and different methods of achieving this - such 
as the use of television to change taxpayers’ attitudes towards fairness and compliance 
(Roberts, 1994) and information campaigns about the public goods and services paid 
for by taxation (Leder, et al. 2010).  
Experimental work has also generated some potentially useful insights and one of 
these is the ‘echo effect’ Kastlunger, et al. (2009). This is the idea that tax audits can 
reverberate in a taxpayer’s mind and increase their compliance with the tax system in 
the future. Experimental evidence suggests that when taxpayers are audited early in 
their taxpaying careers this can lead them to overestimate the probability of being 
audited in the future and thus increase their compliance. However the echo effect may 
be much less if such a tax audit is only undertaken after an individual has experienced 
many years without such an audit. There are other ideas coming from experimental 
evidence, such as the ‘bomb crater effect’ (Mittone, 2006), which may be less 
convincing. The term comes from the observation that troops in battle take cover in 
the craters of recent explosions thinking it unlikely that subsequent shells will fall in 
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exactly the same place.  Similarly it is conjectured that some taxpayers think a tax 
audit will not soon be followed by another one. However it is not known how 
significant such an effect might be in practice, particularly as tax authorities are likely 
to pay additional attention to less compliant taxpayers. Nevertheless all such aspects 
are worth exploring. In addition, a similar development to behavioural economics has 
taken the form of ‘responsive regulation’ and to this we now turn. 
4. RESPONSIVE REGULATION IN TAXATION 
Like the behavioural approach, the development of ‘responsive regulation’ has made 
an additional contribution to regulation including its application to taxation. There 
have been some valuable contributions such as those by Braithwaite (2007), Kirchler 
et al., Leviner (2008) and Ventry (2008). Responsive regulation fits well with 
behavioural economics as Valerie Braithwaite’s (2007: 5) comment illustrates:  
Responsive regulation is a complex business. It welcomes the voice of 
dissidents, it deliberates on shared community goals and understandings, it 
enforces agreed upon standards, preferably through teaching, persuading and 
encouraging those who fall short…It seeks to dismantle any formula that 
presumes that individuals or groups are uniformly programmed in the way 
that they will respond to regulatory demands. 
Since responsive regulation is also based on taxpayer motivation, further 
developments may benefit considerably from insights generated by behavioural 
economics. Essentially, the idea is that the response to non-compliance should be 
related to the reasons for non-compliance. Official activity with respect to taxpayers 
may therefore vary from the case of individuals or firms who are deliberately non-
compliant to people who are trying to comply and simply need help to do so.  In terms 
of taxation, there have been considerable developments, not least in Australia and 
New Zealand and the approach is illustrated in Figure 2 where the action taken by the 
tax authorities is responsive to taxpayers’ willingness to comply. 
Responsive regulation involves taking account of a range of factors which may affect 
the response of taxpayers to changes in legislation, supporting taxpayers in meeting 
their obligations to comply and recognising that different taxpayers may respond in 
different ways. Baldwin and Black (2008: 59) go on to suggest that ‘really responsive 
regulation’ with respect to firms ‘seeks to add to current theories of enforcement by 
stressing the case for regulators to be responsive not only to the attitude of the 
regulated firm but also to the operating and cognitive frameworks of firms; the 
institutional environment and performance of the regulatory regime’. The next task is 
to consider these ideas with respect to tax authorities themselves. 
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Figure 2 
Compliance Model Developed in Australia and New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxpayer decides 
not to comply                                                                                                                                               Force of  
                                                                                                                                                    the law 
                                                                                        ******* 
 
Do not want                                                                                      Deter by 
to comply                                                                               detection 
 
                                                                                     ********** 
 
Try to but                                        Assist to  
don’t always                                             comply 
succeed 
                                                                                      ********* 
 
Willing to                                              Make it  
do the                                                   easy 
right 
thing 
 
                                                                     create pressure downwards 
 
Attitude to compliance                                                                                              Compliance strategy 
 
Source: James (2006) 
 
5. RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE TAX AUTHORITIES 
The approach of behavioural economics may also contribute to avoiding the risks of 
poor performance of the part of tax authorities themselves since, of course, tax 
officials are also human! In a study of Australian taxpayers and tax officials, Kirchler 
et al. (2006, p. 515) concluded that treating taxpayers reasonably and fairly, explaining 
rules and decisions and providing reliable information will improve the reputation of 
tax officers which may lead to an increasing willingness to comply with the spirit of 
the law. Unfortunately, a poor level of service may lead to the opposite outcome and 
sometimes tax administrations can face difficulties even - paradoxically – when 
spending considerable effort on changing their management systems.  
Also unfortunately, tax administration in the UK provides an illustration of such 
difficulties, with a major merger, a substantial cut in resources and a radical change in 
management culture involving private sector techniques based on ‘rational’ rather than 
‘behavioural’ principles. Indications of problems had been emerging for some time 
with taxpayer complaints about the failure of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to 
respond to telephone calls and letters.  In addition there were several serious errors 
which affected millions of taxpayers and the difficulties increasingly attracted official 
attention. The Treasury Select Committee (2011, ‘Conclusions and 
Recommendations’, para. 46) report on HMRC concluded:  
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The evidence we have received in this inquiry has been disturbing. HMRC's 
delivery of services to the general public has fallen to unacceptable levels in 
several areas. Many factors have contributed to this process: overly 
ambitious expectations for IT projects, sustained cuts to resources, a 
management culture of ‘command and control’, increasingly complex tax 
legislation and the legacy of the merger.   
The Treasury Select Committee (2011) also looked specifically at management issues. 
It reported that the Cabinet Office’s people survey of Autumn 2010 ranked HMRC 
bottom of the entire civil service – indeed the HMRC score was even lower than in the 
previous year.  The Committee stated in its conclusions and recommendations (para. 
4) that: 
The evidence we have received about the management culture within 
HMRC, supported by the staff survey results, is very disturbing. There is a 
perception that the Department is run on the principles of close control and 
management scrutiny, with little opportunity for individuals to develop 
autonomy and exercise their skills. Whilst there is a need for consistency in 
dealing with people's tax affairs and appropriate performance management, a 
culture such as the one described to us is likely to harm staff morale and lead 
to disengagement and poor performance. 
The first of the factors mentioned above – the merger between the Inland Revenue and 
Customs and Excise to form HM Revenue and Customs - took place in 2005. Both 
departments had very long and well-established but different cultures and 
organisation. The Financial Times (9 July 2004), described the merger as the mating 
of the Inland Revenue retriever with the Customs and Excise terrier. The Inland 
Revenue was primarily responsible for direct taxation and its origins can be traced 
back to the Board of Taxes established in 1665. A separate Board of Stamps was set 
up in 1694. Customs and Excise was responsible for collecting customs duties, excise 
duties and value added tax and also had certain agency functions. The role of customs 
officers can be traced back to the thirteenth century and a Board of Customs to the 
seventeenth century. After the merger of the two departments HM Inspectors of Taxes 
and other tax officials were all designated Officers of Revenue and Customs, which 
may not have helped morale either. 
In addition to the merger, the resources available to HMRC are being reduced – it is 
required to reduce its running costs in real terms by 25 per cent by the end of 2014-15 
(National Audit Office, 2011, para. 3). Both the merger and the cut in resources were 
likely to lead to difficulties but the focus here is on managerial change where a 
behavioural approach may have most to offer. 
The management changes at HMRC can be seen as a feature of the ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM) in many countries as described, for example, by Pollitt and  
Bouchaert (2011). NPM takes a ‘business-like’ approach to public sector management  
and places a greater emphasis on ‘performance’ particularly through the measurements 
of ‘outputs’, market-type mechanisms and treating ‘service-users’ as ‘customers’. As 
Pollitt and  Bouchaert, (ibid. p. 10) point out, a number of commentators have 
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observed tensions between the ‘economistic’ low trust way of thinking involving 
rational systems of rewards and punishments and a more behavioural way of thinking 
with a greater trust in the inherent creativity of staff provided they are properly led and 
motivated.  
The implicit ‘economistic’ assumption of some fashionable management theories may 
account partly for their initial appeal. Managing people within a formal and rational 
structure with incentives, targets and so on seems consistent with a basically logical 
process and to promise improvements in efficiency. Indeed, there has been comment 
about such theories being advanced in this way by vested interests. For example, 
Newall et al. (2001, p. 8) describe active management fashion setters (consultants, 
gurus, IT suppliers, professional groups and so on) developing ‘rhetorics about best 
practice...by echoing felt gaps in efficiency and performance’. It was put even more 
clearly by Baskerville and Myers (2009, p. 647) who defined a management fashion as 
‘a relatively transitory belief that a certain management technique leads to rational 
management progress’. 
With respect to the UK and the HMRC, concerns have been examined in the academic 
literature (for example by, Carter, et al. 2011a and 2011b). One issue of concern has 
been the use of ‘lean techniques’ at HMRC.  Such techniques were developed in the 
business sector, primarily in the motor industry, and the central idea is that removing 
wasteful processes from production will lead to improvements in efficiency and 
quality (see for example, Womack et al. 1990 and Holweg, 2007). It was an indication 
of how things were to be changed that Sir David Varney from the private sector joined 
HMRC in 2004 and was appointed as the first Chief Executive of the newly merged 
HMRC 2005. Also in 2005 it was decided to introduce lean management techniques 
across HMRC and lean management formed a major part of the PaceSetter 
Programme which had the aim of improving business performance and staff 
engagement (National Audit Office, 2011, para. 5). In a review for HMRC, Radnor 
and Bucci (2007, p. 20) found that the principles of lean management were absorbed 
by HMRC staff and there was a ‘very good understanding of the background to Lean 
and its principles’ across all the sites they visited and across all grades of staff. They 
also found that the most commonly cited principles of Lean were customer focus, 
developing and improving standard processes, increasing efficiency, removing waste 
and increasing productivity and quality.  In a later paper, Radnor and Bucci (2008 as 
quoted by Carter et al. 2011a) stated that HMRC ‘are the closest of any public service 
to date in implementing the Lean philosophy’. 
Furthermore it was anticipated that the changes would address the requirement to save 
resources. For instance the Varney Review (2006, p. 5) by Sir David Varney required 
an improvement in ‘public sector contact centre performance by establishing 
performance targets and best practice benchmarks… [so]…reducing operating costs 
by 25 per cent’. 
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No doubt changes in tax administration are necessary as the tax environment and 
technology change but possibly there was insufficient appreciation of advantages of 
the methods of tax administration that had developed over long periods. There were 
also concerns whether such management techniques were entirely appropriate in such 
a public sector context. Indeed there has been a growing body of evidence that this 
approach is associated with some undesirable outcomes. 
A study by Carter et al. (2011a and 2011b) of HMRC staff in 2008/09 involving an 
initial interview analysis followed by a questionnaire survey produced results that 
were some way removed from the advantages claimed for such management 
approaches. They found that the fragmentation of processes and the imposition of 
hourly targets had adversely affected quality and productivity, there had been a 
negative impact on non-targeted work, a loss of control and discretion leading to 
deskilling and difficulties for managers and supervisors in managing effectively as 
their attention was focused on statistical information. A conclusion of particular 
concern was that while ‘statistics may reveal productivity and performance 
improvements, further investigation reveals that they are constructed accordingly and 
collusion in this process occurs on many different levels’ (Carter et al. 2011a, p.120). 
In a further paper on the subject, Carter et al. (2011b, p. 94) concluded that the 
enforcement of the ‘appositely named lean “PaceSetter” system generated a series of 
damaging outcomes for a hitherto skilled and loyal public servant workforce’, with 
much previously skilled service reduced to ‘little more than semi-skilled assembly line 
work’ (p.95). 
A behavioural perspective of such issues has considerable advantages over such an 
approach. Echoing Veblen’s comment above, in a management context, Kaufman 
(1999, p. 387) suggests that the closest real world approximation of economic man 
and the model of self-interested rational choice is a child under eight years old where 
behaviour can be predicted on the basis of ‘getting what you want makes you happy’. 
Kaufman concludes that, although the rational choice model is a powerful device, it 
cannot adequately explain employee behaviour in many cases. In contrast, behavioural 
economics has indicated directly some of the advantages of management based on 
‘employee involvement, commitment and empowerment…[but not]…employee 
control’ (Tomer, 2001, p. 64). Indeed there is substantial evidence that using workers’ 
contributions in this way produces better results in complex situations than have more 
mechanistic approaches to management.  
5.1 Fairness 
A further general concern in the UK in the recent past has been the fairness of tax 
administration. As pointed out above, behavioural economics recognises the 
importance individuals place on fairness in a way that the rational approach does not. 
In taxation this can mean the difference between a successful tax and a failed one – 
such as the UK’s community charge (James, 2012). HMRC has been the subject of 
considerable press coverage about the allegedly favourable terms granted to certain 
very large organisations but not to the great majority of taxpayers. One of the 
conclusions of the Public Accounts Committee (2011) was:  
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The Department is not being even handed in its treatment of taxpayers. It is unfair 
that large companies can settle their tax disputes...at less than the full amount due 
and that they have been allowed up to 10 years to pay their tax liabilities, while 
small businesses and individuals on tax credits are not allowed similar leeway. 
While the approach of ‘doing deals’ with large taxpayers might be consistent with a 
business-like approach described above, it can undermine the public sector ethos of 
tax administration and therefore the tax morale of the vast majority of individuals. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Mainstream economic analysis, based on the self-interested rational choice model, has 
proved to be a powerful means of understanding taxation. However this approach has 
its limitations and a more comprehensive approach can be developed by drawing on 
behavioural economics. Tax authorities have managed risk throughout the history of 
taxation but in recent years there have been considerable developments in applying 
risk management to tax administration by the European Commission, the OECD and 
others. There have also been considerable developments in behavioural economics. 
These offer valuable insights regarding taxpayer behaviour and many further 
applications are likely to prove worthwhile.  Responsive regulation has also 
contributed to a more sensitive approach to managing taxpayer risk and is based on 
taxpayer motivation. Responsive regulation may also benefit from applications of 
behavioural economics.  
Taxpayers are also affected by the operation of tax agencies. Individuals who are 
treated reasonably and assisted effectively where appropriate are more likely to 
comply with the spirit of the law than individuals who are poorly treated. Insights 
from behavioural economics may not only be helpful in improving taxpayer 
compliance but also the performance of tax officials. A particular aspect has been the 
development of management methods used within tax authorities themselves. 
Unfortunately management techniques, often transplanted from the private sector and 
based on the self-interested rational choice model, have not always delivered the 
promised benefits. Some of the difficulties arise because tax authorities are not market 
based profit maximizing organizations. However, difficulties may also arise because 
tax officials have to deal with important and complex issues in a public sector context. 
The performance of tax officials may be enhanced if they are able to develop a 
professional approach to their duties rather than be subject to more mechanistic 
methods of management.  
In conclusion, there is evidence to suggest that many taxpayers do not act in their own 
immediate self-interest by pursuing every possible opportunity to avoid or evade 
taxation and so do not have to be tightly regulated. Rather, there may be significant 
advantages in shifting the emphasis of tax compliance policy towards treating the 
majority of them as responsible citizens and using the insights of behavioural 
economics to do this in the most effective ways. Similarly using a more behavioural 
approach might avoid the disadvantages of some managerial systems being employed 
in tax agencies with outcomes such as those noted above. Developing a professional 
approach among tax officials would also encourage responsible citizens to fulfil their 
tax obligations. 
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